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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellis argued that the district court erred when it 
denied his motion to suppress. Specifically, Mr. Ellis argued, in reliance on United 
States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012), that he need not establish that he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched, because the State trespassed 
on his property to reach that area. Mr. Ellis also argued, in reliance on State v. Fuller, 
138 Idaho 60 (2002), and l.C. § 20-228, that he was not subject to the Fourth 
Amendment waivers which were contained in his parole agreement because the terms 
of the agreement and his status as a parolee were suspended when he was taken into 
custody for a prior parole violation. 
In response, the State ignores the Jones Opinion, and argues that Mr. Ellis had 
to establish a privacy interest in the area where the contraband was located. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-8.) The State also argues that the terms of the parole 
agreement were enforceable until Mr. Ellis' parole was formally revoked. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.8-11.) Additionally, the State argues that it does not matter whether the terms 
of the parole agreement were suspended at the time Mr. Ellis was taken into custody 
because the State could enter his apartment based on reasonable grounds due to his 
status as a parolee. (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-13.) 
This brief is necessary to address the State's assertion that it could enter 
Mr. Ellis' apartment based on reasonable grounds due to his status as a parolee. 
Mr. Ellis asserts that the State's arguments disregard the holding in Fuller and l.C. § 20-
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228, as Mr. Ellis was no longer a parolee when he was arrested for the parole violation 
and the subsequent search of his apartment was, therefore, illegal. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Eiiis's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ellis' motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ellis' Motion To Suppress 
Idaho Code Section 20-228 states that parole is suspended after the issuance of 
an arrest warrant and during the time the parolee's status is that of a fugitive of the law. 
In State v. Fuller, 138 Idaho 60 (2002), the Idaho Supreme Court interpreted l.C. § 20-
228 in conjunction with l.C. § 20-219, and held that a parolee is still under the 
supervision of the board of correction after an arrest warrant is issued and the terms of 
a parole agreement are applicable until the parolee is taken into custody. Based on the 
foregoing authority, Mr. Ellis argued in his Appellant's Brief that he was no longer on 
parole after he was arrested. In response, the State argues, in reliance on a line of 
cases which hold that there is a Fourth Amendment exception applicable to parolees, 
that it only needs reasonable grounds to conduct a warrantless search of a parolee's 
home. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 11-13.) The State's argument and the line of cases on 
which it relies are inapposite because they do not address Mr. Ellis' claim that his status 
as a parolee and the board of correction's supervisory authority over him ceased to 
exist when he was arrested for the parole violation. 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues, in reliance on State v. Klingler, 143 
Idaho 494 (2006), that it only needed to establish reasonable grounds to enter Mr. Ellis' 
home due to his status as a parolee. In Klinger, Mr. Klingler pleaded guilty to felony 
non-support of his children and was placed on probation. Id. at 495. As a term of his 
probation, Mr. Klingler waived his Fourth Amendment rights to be free from warrantless 
searches of his person, vehicle, and residence. Id. Mr. Klingler's probation was 
revoked. Id. The district court reinstated probation, but the new terms of his probation 
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did not include a Fourth Amendment waiver. Id. The State then conducted a 
warrantless search of Mr. Klingler's residence and found marijuana and 
methamphetamine. Id. Mr. Klingler filed a suppression motion, which was denied by 
the district court based on the theory that the State could search his residence absent a 
Fourth Amendment waiver due to his status a probationer. Id. Mr. Klingler appealed. 
Id. 
One of the issues on appeal was whether the State could conduct a warrantless 
search Mr. Klingler's home based merely on reasonable grounds. 1 Id. at 496-497. The 
Idaho Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the district court and held that, as a 
probationer, Mr. Klingler has a lesser degree of liberty and "a warrantless search of an 
unsupervised probationer's residence may be conducted upon reasonable grounds." Id. 
at 497. In other words, there is a Fourth Amendment warrant exception which exists 
when the State has reasonable grounds to search a probationer or parolee. 
In coming to the foregoing conclusion, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that in 
parole and probation cases "there is a heightened need for close supervision of the 
convicted person's activities to protect society and the releasee himself, and the 
releasee is entitled only to conditional liberty .... " Id. The Klingler Court also reasoned 
that "the probation department needs to be able to assure compliance with probation in 
1 Mr. Klinger specifically argued that he was on unsupervised probation as opposed to 
supervised probation and that he had heightened Fourth Amendment protections when 
compared to a probationer on supervised probation. Id. at 496-497. The Idaho 
Supreme Court rejected that argument based on l.C. § 20-219, which states that the 
"state board of correction shall be charged with the duty of supervising all persons 
convicted of a felony placed on probation or released from the State penitentiary on 
parole .... " Id. at 497. The Supreme Court reasoned that the board of correction's 
supervision was not conditional on probation being characterized as "supervised." Id. 
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an expedited fashion without the necessity of probable cause. The delay inherent in 
obtaining a warrant would make it difficult for probation officials to respond quickly to 
evidence of misconduct and 'reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of 
expeditious searches otherwise creates."' Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 
868, 877 (1987)). 
There are multiple reasons why the Klingler case is not applicable to the facts of 
this case; the main one being that Mr. Klingler was released on probation when his 
residence was searched while, in this case, Mr. Ellis was in custody at the time his 
apartment was searched. The Idaho Supreme Court's reasoning in Fuller provides 
support for Mr. Ellis' contention. In that case, there was an arrest warrant for the 
parolee, Mr. Fuller. Fuller, 138 Idaho at 61. After the arrest warrant was issued, but 
before Mr. Fuller was taken into custody on that warrant, Mr. Fuller was subjected to a 
search of his person based on a Fourth Amendment waiver contained in his parole 
agreement. Id. at 61-62. Mr. Fuller challenged this search based on the language in 
l.C. § 20-228 which states that "Such warrant shall serve to suspend the person's parole 
until a determination on the merits of the allegations of the violation has been made 
pursuant to a revocation hearing." Id. at 62. Mr. Fuller argued that this language meant 
that his parole agreement was suspended because an arrest warrant for a parole 
violation had been issued before he was searched. Id. at 62. The Idaho Supreme 
Court rejected this argument based on l.C. § 20-219, which states that a parolee is 
under the supervisory authority of the board of correction as long as the parolee is 
"released" on parole. Id. at 63. The Supreme Court reasoned that a "parolee is 
'released' when he is allowed to be out of confinement." Id. The Supreme Court then 
6 
held that as "long as [Mr. Fuller] was released, the Department had the duty of 
supervising him, and the parole supervision agreement he signed was still in effect." Id. 
Based on that logic, once a defendant is taken into custody s/he is no longer under 
control of the board of correction, ass/he is no longer released from custody. It follows 
that Mr. Ellis was no longer under the supervision of the board of correction when he 
was taken into custody and, therefore, he was not a parolee. Therefore, the 
probationer/parolee warrant exception is not applicable to this case. 
Further support for Mr. Ellis' argument can be found in the policy rationale of the 
Klinger Opinion. As stated above, the policy for the probationer/parolee exception to 
the warrant requirement is to protect society from a parolee. It follows that society will 
be protected from the parolee if the parole officer is not encumbered by the delay 
caused by the warrant requirement. This policy rationale is no longer applicable after a 
parolee is arrested and in custody, as society is protected from the former parolee while 
s/he is incarcerated. The ability for the State to enter Mr. Ellis' home without a warrant 
would not have any effect on his conduct while in prison. Since the purpose of the 
probationer/parolee exception to the Fourth Amendment is obviated after a parolee is 
taken into custody, the exception is no longer reasonable. See United States v. 
Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998) (reasonableness is the "touchstone" which governs all 
Fourth Amendment analysis). Moreover, the Court of Appeals has held that the 
probationer/parolee exception to the warrant requirement is justified due to the 
existence of a special relationship between a parolee and the parole officer. State v. 
Palmer, 110 Idaho 142, 144 (Ct. App. 1985). Again, that justification for the 
probationer/parolee exception is no longer applicable after a parolee is taken into 
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custody, as the parole officer/parolee relationship is dramatically changed after a 
parolee is incarcerated because the parolee is no longer monitored by the parole officer. 
Finally, it is unreasonable to consider someone in custody as a parolee for the 
purposes of the probationer/parolee warrant exception because the parolee cannot 
perform the terms of the parolee agreement while in custody and the State is not 
performing its obligations. For example, Mr. Ellis could not continue looking for a job 
and attend treatment while he was in custody and the State was no longer letting him 
live in the community. After Mr. Ellis was arrested, neither the State nor Mr. Ellis were 
adhering to the terms of the parole agreement. It appears that the Idaho Legislature 
recognized this when it wrote l.C. § 20-228 and stated that a defendant's status as a 
parolee is suspended when s/he is waiting for the disposition of her/his parole 
violations. If Mr. Ellis was still technically a parolee after he was arrested he would be in 
continual violation of the terms of his parole agreement because he would not be able to 
fulfill those obligations while in custody. 
In sum, Mr. Ellis was no longer under supervision of the board of correction after 
he was taken into custody for the parole violation. At that point in time, he was no 
longer on parole as l.C. § 20-228 suspended his status as a parolee until the disposition 
of the parole revocation proceedings. Klinger is irrelevant because it dealt with a 
probationer who was out of custody and under the supervision of the board of 
correction. As such, the probation/parolee exception is not applicable in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ellis respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to suppress and remand this case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this ylh day of March, 2013. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
9 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ih day of March, 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a 
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
MARK LEE ELLIS 
INMATE #65365 
ICIO 
381 W HOSPITAL DRIVE 
OROFINO 83544 
DEBORAH A BAIL 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
CURTIS MCKENZIE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court. 
SFW/eas 
EVAN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
10 
